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Where a testator directs the income of shares of stock to be paid to one for life
with remainder to other parties, dividends declared on the stock during the lifetenancy go to the life-tenant and not to the remainderman.
The facts that the dividends are unusually large, that they consist of accumulations of profit withheld during past years, and that they are declared in the form of
certificates of indebtedness of the corporation, will not prevent them from becoming
the property of the life-tenant if they are intended by the corporation as a distribution of income.
Under a provision of the Code that " the natural increase of the property belongs
to the tenant for life; any extraordinary accumulanon of the corpus, such as issue
of new stock upon the shares of an incorporated or joint stock company, attaches to
the corpus and goes with it to the remainderman," dividends whether ordinary or
extraordinary, if they represent a distribution of the income of the stock, go to the
life-tenant.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
JACKsoN, 0. J.-Certain shares of Central and Southwestern

Railroad stock were left by the will of Mrs. Millen to Guerrard,
in trust for George R. Millen and his children, the income'to be

paid to Millen during life, and remainder to his children, with contingent remainder over in the event -oftheir death.

After probate

of this will, the directors of the Central Railroad Company declared
a dividend in certificates of indebtedness (in addition to a cash
dividend) of $30 per share on the Central and $32 per share on
the Southwestern stock, the Central Railroad having leased the
latter road some years before on certain terms specified in the
lease. The question made in this case is: Do these dividends go
to George R. Millen, the life-tenant, or to the remaindermen ?

The will directs the income of the stock to be paid to the lifetenant. Are dividends of stock the income of stock ? If not,.
what are they ? They are certainly no part of the eorpus. They
do not increase the shares one iota. lor could these dividends

have been so applied by the directors as to add to the copious, that
is, to increase the stock, because the limit upon the number of
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shares allowed the company by its charter is exhausted. These
dividends could not be so used as to increase the corpus, and hence
the directors declared the dividends, and gave them to the stockhold6rs as dividends, and not as corpus. What did the testatrix
mean when she gave to George R. Millen for life the income of
this stock? Most clearly she meant the dividends declared by the
directors ; for there is, there can be, no income from the stock of
a railroad company except the dividends declared thereon. Nor
does the testatrix limit the amount or value ;f this income to be
enjoyed for life by this life-tenant. It matters not how little or
how large the dividend declared, it is income from the stock, and
it goes to the life-tenant. No matter in what it be declared,
whether in cash or in bonds, no matter whether it be the accumulation of years or of one year, if it be the income from the stock,
and not the corpus, zhe stock itself, by the terms of the will, which
is the law of the case, it goes to the life-tenant. No matter what,
therefore, may be the law in respect to cases generally, which may
arise under this action of the directors of the Central Railroad
Company, in this case, under this will, these dividends, in the
shape of these interest-bearing certificates, are income, and not
cor2pus, and go to the life-tenant, and not to the remaindermen.
But suppose that the will be not in the case, and that by any
sort of deed or instrument of conveyance this stock were the property of one for life, and of others in remainder, where would
these dividends go? Whose property would they then be? That
question will turn on the resolutions of the directors and the Code
of this state, that is, upon the true meaning and construction of
those resolutions, and of section 2256 of the Code. The resolutions
show that dividends due these shares of stock had been "withheld"
for past years, that the owners of the stock had not received anything "to represent their dividends and income thus withheld,"
and that, therefore, these certificates of indebtedness are issued.
Clearly, therefore, these certificates represent, as declared on the
face of the preamble and resolutions, past dividends withheld, and
are declared in lieu of those dividends and that income from this
stock which were withheld. It is as much as to say that the
income from this stock was made in certain years, but not declared
in those years for prudential reasons; those reasons do not now
exist; therefore, this, the income of those years, will be declared
as dividends now and be paid now. Suppose it had been declared
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in cash, would there be a doubt that the cash would be the money
of the life-tenant? We think not.
Suppose it had been declared in bonds of other persons, of the
state, or the United States, or a city, or other railroad corporation,
would it not go just as cash would have gone? Most certainly, it
seems to us. What difference, then, can it make if the company
gave its own bonds, or evidences of debt, as dividends representing
part income? None, logically, sq far as we can discern it. The
directors thus calling these certificates of indebtedness dividends,
and issuing them as dividends, we come to the question, where do
they go under the Code of Georgia-to the life-tenant or to the
The Code, section 2256, enacts that "The
remainderman?
natural increase of the property belongs to the tenant for life.
Any extraordinary accumulation of the corpus-such as issue of
new stock upon the shares of an incorporated'or joint stock company-attaches to the corpus, and goes with it to the remainderman." Are dividends, though unusually large, because withheld
when they might have been declared but for prudential reasons,
an extraordinary accumulation of the corpus, or are they the
natural increase of the property, in the sense of this statute? We
take it that the words "natural increase" are used in antithesis to
the subsequent words, " extraordinary accumulation," and they
mean the ordinary accumulation of the property ; that is, in case
of stock, the ordinary increase of its value by larger dividends
declared, whereby it may be worth much more in the income of the
holder from it, -goes to the life-tenant; but any extraordinary
increase or accumulation, by donation or grant from the state of
lands, or other outside property, will go to the remainderman.
That property thus accumulated, not from the ordinary use of
the means of the company, but from extraordinary outside accumulations attaching to the former means or corpus of the company,
and adding to that corpus, or those means, assimilates with that,
becomes part of it, makes it larger and productive of more fruit,
and can not be cut off by the life-tenant, but must stand tied to
the corpus, and with the corpus pass to the remainderman.
But really dividends are the ordinary, the natural, the only
natural income or increase of this sort of property. There can be
no natural birth from this parent, except dividends-be born of her
womb. Railroad stock produces that naturally, in the very order of
its creation, according to the very law of its existence, breathed into
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it by the legislature when it became a living entity. Its makek
then said to it: " Be fruitful and multiply dividends." So that
according to its organic nature, it makes and distributes dividends;
and their birth is no more extraordinary than that of a child from
healthy parents, and the issue of large dividends no more extraordinary or unnatural than the birth of twins. We think, therefore,
that these terms, " natural" and "extraordinary," are not in the
way of carrying into effect the intention of the testatrix and of the
directors. Nor are the words, " such as issue of new stock upon
the share of an incorporated or joint-stock company." They are
a mere illustration of extraordinary accumulations.
The issue of new stock is not an ordinary increase. It is
not a natural increase. In this case it would have been very
unnatural, because the law of tlie creation of this corporation
prohibited this issue. The corporation must receive new powers
from its maker before it could do this extraordinary, and as it
now stands chartered, wholly unnatural and illegal thing.
*Itcould not declare new stock, but it could declare any number
and amount of dividends. Besides, the corpus of this property
is the shares of this stock. The only way to accumulate on
this corpus is to increase these shares. If this corporation had
possessed the power to do so, and had carried out that power, then
the new stock would have assimilated to the old, become part and
parcel of the corpus, and could not have been severed from it by
the life-tenant; but by the Code it would have gone over to the
remainderman. Nor do we see any other possible way of adding
to this corpus--the old stock-except by the issue of new stock.
That is the only thing that can accumulate in kind on it, and
assimilate and become'corporate with it. Bonds of the company,
or promissory notes of it, or certificates of indebtedness by it, are
not accretions to its stock, nor in any legal sense part of its corpus.
Indeed they are just the opposite. They are burdens upon it.
They are debt, wliich the natural fruit of the corpus will have to
pay, instead of new stock engrafted on the old to produce more
fruit. So that on mature reflection we are of the opinion that these
certificates of indebtedness, principal and interest, are the property
of the life-tenant; and the judgment of the court below denying
the injunction is affirmed.
The respective interests of a life-tenant
and remainderman in stoAk, is a subject

which has given rise to a number of very
difficult and interesting legal problems,
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the solution of which it is to be feared
has not yet been satisfactorily reached.
From time to time during the continuance of a life tenancy, certain benefits
are usually conferred by the corporation
upon the various holders of its stock;
In addition to the division of the profits
at stipulated intervals in the shape of
ordinary dividends, it occasionally distributes further sums constituting what
are known as extraordinary dividends
or bonuses. Sometimes it divides a portion of its surplus profits in the form of a
stock dividend. Sometimes it sells a
portion of its franchises or property and
distributes the proceeds among its stockholders. Sometimes it increases its capi:
tal by the issaing of new stock, the
option of subscribing to which is granted
to the stockholders. If the affairs of
the corporation be prosperous this option
can often be sold in the market so as to
realize a handsome profit. Or if the
stackholders elect themselves to subscribe to the new stock, they often find
it worth in their hands, at once, more
than the amount laid out for its purchase.
The question frequently arises, to
whom shall these various benefits-dividends, bonuses, stock dividends, proceeds of corporation property or franchises and options-be adjudged, to
belong?
Are they properly to be
deemed as belonging to the life-tenant,
or are they to be capitalized and retained
intact for the remainderman ? The object
of this note is to preent in compact
shape the leading principles by which
the courts have been guided in their
adjudications upon this subject. A lifetenant of real or personal property
generally is entitled only to the income
or interest accruing during the period of
his tenancy. This rule obtains equally
with regard to stock as it does to other
property.
A life-tenant of stock is
therefore entitled only to the "income"
arising during his life. And whether the
will or deed by which his life estate is
VOL. XXX.-49

created provides that lie shall have the
"income,"
or the "dividends,"
or
" the dividends and profits," or "the
dividends, interest and profits," or " the
interest,, dividends, profits and proceeds," there is no substantial diffesence as to his rights, the phrases being
generally considered identical in effect:
Hooper v. Rossiter, I BMOL. 527.
Of course if the will or deed in question clearly indicates an intention on the
part of the testator or settlor that the
life-tenant shall have other and broader
rights, this intention will be strictly
carried out: Ward v. Combe, 7 Sim.
634 ; Cundng v. Boswell, 2 Jur. (N. S.)
1005 ; Balch v. Hallt, 10 Gray 402 ;
Reed v. Head, 6 Allen 174; 61arkson
v. Clarkson, 18 Bab. 646.
In the
great majority of instances, however,
no such clear intention appears, and
resort has therefore to be had to legal
principles to determine what the "income" is.
The statement of these
principles will be best understood by
considering in succession the various
classes of benefits conferred by the corporation upon its stockholders :
I. Dividends.-At certain stipulated
periods most corporations are in the
habit of dividing their profits or some
part of them, earned since the previous
stipulated period, among their stockholders.
The sums which are thus
periodically distributed are of course
not constant in amount.
Sometimes
they are larger, sometimes smaller, according as the profits of the corporation
have been large or small. But however
great or insignificant they may be, the
receipt of them at the usual periods is
always looked forward to by the stockholders as a natural incident of their
ownership. These constitute what are
known as the ordinary dividends of a
corporation.
They are to be clearly
distinguished from another class of
dividends occasionally declared. These
are such as are extraordinary in their
nature, usually declared out of the

MILLEN v. GUERRARD.
accumulated profits, not at certain stipu- dividend declared which may be conlated periods, but at irregular intervals, sidered as having accrued since the teswhenever and in such amount as the tdftor's death. A like contention has
corporation sees proper. These are been made where stock has been settled
termed bonuses or extraqrdinary divi- for life with remainder over and the lifedends. The receipt of them cannot be tenant dies between the dividend days.
looked forward to with confidence by The general rule of law forbids such
apportionment as inconvenient, and
the stockholder at any particular period.
The true test whether a dividend is awards all ordinary dividends to those
ordinary or extraordinary is not the during the existence of whose estates
fund from which it is derived. Ordi- they are declared: Earp's Appeal, 4
nary dividends are somctimes declared
Casey (Pa.) 368, 374 ; Clapp Y. Astor,
out of accumulated profts, and extra- 2 Ed. Ch. 319. In England, however,
ordinary dividends out of the profits of
such apportionment is enjoined by Statthe preceding year or helf year. The ute 4 & 5 William IV., c. 22, and by
sole test is what was the intent of the Statute 33 & 34Viet., c. 35, sect. 2; In
corporation declaring it. If the terms re faxwell's Trusts, I H. & AI. Ch.610 ;
of the corporate resolution passed for Hartley v. Allen, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 500.
that purpose, as seen in the light of the But these statutes refer exclusively to
surrounding circumstances, seem to con- dividends on corporation stock, and will
template the distribution of an ordinary not apply in case of quasi dividends of a
dividend, it will not be deemed an ex- private partnership: Jones v. Ogle, L.
traordinary one simply because it is R., 8 Ch. App. 192.
Another question with relation to ordilarger than Asual in amount: Barclay
v. Wainwright, 14 Yes. 66 ; Price v. nary dividends is sometimes litigated
Anderson, 15 Sim. 473. Nor will the between the life-tenant and the remainuse of the word bonus make the divi- derman. "1Where the stock is sold for
dend an extraordinary one, if a con- reinvestment between the dividend days
trary intent is to be inferred from all the then of course the money you get for
the sale is so much more in proportion
circumstances of the cas3 : Preston v.
to the time that has elapsed between the
Melville, 16 Sim. 163; Jchnson v. .ohnson, 15 Jur. 714. All ordinary divi- last dividend day and the next dividend
dends declared during the life-tenancy, day. Therefore the price you get is
no matter from what source derived, are compounded partly and chiefly of the
to be considered as income, and are value of the stock itself, and partly of
the value of that portion of the divitherefore the property of the life-tenant:
dends which may be considered as
ooper v. Rossiter, 1 bcL. 527. Nor
does it make any difference that the apportioned to the period which has
profits oui of which they are declared elapsed since the last dividend day :"
were earned prior to the inception of the Sckolefield v. R~edfern, 8 L. T. R.
(N. S.) 487. In such case it has been
life-tenapey: Bates v. .lfackinley, 31
Bear. 280. Ordinary dividends so far contended on behalf of the life-tenant
partake of the nature of interest that that the value of the stock itself alone
from time to time endeavors have been
should be regarded as capital, and that
the amount by which the purchase-money
made to apply to them the principle of
Where, therefore, for is augmented in consequence of the proxapportionment.
example, stock is bequeathed, and the imity of the next dividend day should
testator dies between the dividend days,
be deemed income, and therefore paid
it has been contended that, the legatee is over to him. But the administration of
entitled only to that portion of the next such an equity would be a practical im-
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possibility. The amount of the forthcoming dividend can never be precisely
known, and the price of stock in the
market is liable to be affected by a thousand contingencies which bear no possible relation to the time when that
dividend falls due. How then can it
be determined what portion of that price
is to be set down to the account of
accrued dividend? "The reason why
such an equity has never been administered habitually," says V. 0. KINDEnsL Y, "is the serious and grievous burden it would impose to enter into such a
complicated question as it would involve :" Scholefield v. Redfern, supra.
The principle, however, is undoubtedly
correct, and if a satisfactory result can
be obtained as to the elements of the
price it will be applied. Where, therefore, stock was sold for reinvestment,
and delivered only two days prior to the
closing of the transfer books of the corporation preparatory to declaring a dividend, it was held that a sum equal to
the whole of that dividend should be
deducted from the purchase-money and
paid to the tenant for life, on the ground
that it was clear under the circumstances
that the price of the stock itself had been
augmented by just that amount: Londesborough v. Somerville, 19 Beav. 295.
IL ExtraordinaryDividendsor Bonuses
and Stoc: Dividends.-It is not always
the policy of a corporation to divide all
its profits among its stockholders as
quickly as they are made. Prudence
will usually dictate the setting apart
from time to time of a portion of those
profits to constitute a reserve or surplus fund, of which the corporation may
make such use as it sees proper. Sometimes it employs this fund, or a portion
of it, in making permanent improvements upon its property, so as to facilitate and extend its business. Sometimes it expends it for the acquisition
of new property, either real or personal,
which may have become essential or
desirable to carry out the purposes of

the charter. Sometimes it simply retains the fund, and allows it to accumulate, in order to insure public confidence
in the full ability of the corporation to
meet its obligations. Occasionally the
further retention and accumulation of
such a fund becomes, for some reason,
unnecessary, and the corporation then
makes a division of the whole or a part
of it among its stockholders. This it
may do in the shape of an ordinary
Usually, however, it does
dividend.
so in the shape of an extraordinary
dividend or bonus. Sometimes it happens that the surplus fund, being either
needed or spent for the acquisition or
improvement of property, it is considered desirable to issue new certificates
of stock gratuitously to the various
stockholders in an amount equal to the
sums thus needed or expended. In this
way the accumulated profits become, as
far as the corporation is concerned, new
capital. The shares issued to represent
this new capital constitute a stock dividend.
Where bonuses and stock dividends
are declared during the existence of a
life-tenancy, frequent litigation has occurred between the life-tenant and the
remainderman as to their ownership.
It is often the case that a part of the
profits out of which they are declared
wdre earned prior to the death of the
testator by whose will the stock was
bequeathed, prior to the execution of
the deed by which it was settled, or
prior to the investment in such stock
of the property in which by such deed
or will the life-tenancy has been created.
Numerous cases arose in England
upon this state of facts in the early
part of the century. In all of them it
was contended that so much of the bonus
or stock dividend as consisted of profits
which had accrued during the life-tenancy and since the investment, should be
deemed income and awarded to the lifetenant, and that the rest, consisting of
profits which had accrued before that time,
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should be deemed capital: and should be
invested anew, the interest to be paid over
to the life-tenant, but the corpus to be
kept intact for the remainderman. The
correctness of the principle thus contended for does not seem to have been
disputed by the courts, but the difficulties which lay in the way of the
necessary investigation a'; to when the
various parts of the profits out of which
the bonus or stock dividend was declared had accrued, prevented its practical application. Without invoking any
particular principle, therefore, the courts
cut the Gordian knot by awarding every
bonus and stock dividend to the coypus
of the estate. "If I ant to go upon
your principle," said Lord LOUGBOROUGH, in reply to the argument of
the life-tenant's tounsel in Branden v.
Branden, 4 Yes. 800, "1 must hunt it
back, and see to what part of the saving
each is entitled. I have often considered this question, and it always seemed
to me, in all the different ways that I
could turn the consideration of it, that
there was no way to -be taken but to
consider it as an accretion to the capital,
and the tenant for life will have the
benefit of the dividends." This case
was the first of a long series that have
since been determined. Irvine Y. Houston, 4 Pat. H. L. Cas. 521, a Scotch
appeal to the House of Lords, decided
six years later, is to substantially the
same effect, Lord ELD6x saying that a
course of decision such as tle life-tenant
contended for "would have led to inconveniences which would have been
intolerable."
The law on this point
had now becom'e settled. Judges, admitting the total lack of printiple on
which the cases of Brandin v. Branden,
and Irvine v. Houston rested, felt bound
to follow them on the ground of stare
decsis: Clayton v. Gresham, 10 Yes.
288. An attempt to distinguish between
cash bonuses and stock bonuses failed,
Lord ELDON pronouncing the distinction
between them as "too thin :" Paris v.

Paris, 1OVes. 185. Nordiditmakeany
difference what the intention of the corporation might be as to the disposition
of the bonus. "1Wh'atever conduct or
language the bank may hold," said Lord
ERS1xnea, "if they do not increase the
dividend, but take this mode of distributing the profit, it is a part of the capital:" Witts v. Steere, 13 Yes. 363.
See, also, Warde v. Combe, 7 Sim. 634,
and In re Armstrong's Trust, 3 K. &
J. 486. But the evident injustice of
thisline of decision to the life-tenant
made judges solicitous, whenever they
could manage to do so, to secure to him
his rights: Cuming v. Boswell, 2 Jur.
(N. S.) 1005. Whenever, therefore, it
appeared that the profits out of which
a bonus was declared were all made
during the life-tenancy, or subsequent to
the investment in the particular stock,
that bonus was adjudged income, and
awarded to the life-tenant: 3aurray V.
Glasse, 17 Jur. 816; .Plumbe v. ANild,
29 L. J. Oh. 618. And so far did the
courts go that in some cases, in the absence of all direct evidence as to when
the profits out of which the bonus was
declared were made, they presumed them
to have been earned during the life-tenancy: 3ila, ray v. Glasse, supra; Ashhurst et al. v. Field's Adnr., II 0. E.
Green 1. In determining when profits
had accrued some nice questions were
raised. But the actual time of payment
of a debt to a corporation, as distinguished from tile period when it was
incurred or became payable, was fixed
upon as that in which the profit was
deemed to have been made: ilaclaren
v. Stanton, 3 De G., P. & J. 202.
The line of decision which has just
been detailed has, however, been entirely overruled by more modern cases
in the courts of England, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. Those of England
and Massachusetts, and according to the
principal case, those of Georgia have
adopted one principle. Those of New
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York, 'ew Jersey and Pennsylvania,
and possibly those of New Hampshire,
have adopted another. They will be
considered separatel3.
(a.) The Modern Cases in England
and J3a.ssachusetts.--The older English
cases, as has been seen, completely disregarded the intent of a corporation in
declaring a bonus or stock dividend, as
to whether it should be capital or income: Witts v. Steere, 13 Ves. 363.
Yet this, in the modern cases, both in
that country and Massachusetts, has
come to be considered as the turning
point in every controversy. The net
earnings of a corporation remain, it is
said, the property of the company as
fully as any other property, until the
directors see fit to distribute them to the
stockholders. It is quite competent for
the directors to make, in the mean time,
wfatever disposition of those earnings
they may please. They may buy property
for the corporation, make improvements
to that already owned, invest on real or
personal security, or simply allow the
fund to remain idle. No individual
stockholder has any right to control iheir
discretion in the matter, nor has he
power to force them to make distribution of the fund. Hence, it is said,
as the corporation is the owner of these
earnings, to all intents and purposes,
and may distribute' them or not just
as it pleases, that when distribution is
made, such distribution is in the nature
of a gift by the corporation to its various
stockholders, and that such gift may be
made in whatever shape and upon
whatever terms the corporation pleases.
If, therefore, the corporation chooses to
distribute the accumulated earnings with
the intention that the gift shall be a gift
of income, it is to be appropriated as
income; but if with the intention that
the gift shall be a gift of capital, then it
is to be appropriated as capital, and
this without any reference to Me time
when the profits out of which the gift is
made were earned.

The practical application of this principle In several decided cases has furnished the means of laying down the
following rule for ascertaining in every
given case what the intention of tie
corporation is. Where the bonus declared is in the shape of cash, then the
intent of the corporation will be presumed to be to distribute it as income,
unless a contrary intent may be inferred,
either from the terms of the resolution
declaring the bonus, or from the attendant circumstances: Dale v. Hlayes, 40
L. J. Ch. 244 ; In re Hopkins's Trusts,
L. R., 18 Eq. 696 ; Leland v. Hayden,
102 Mass. 542. But where the bonus
declared is in the shape of stock, then
the intent of the corporation will be
presumeid to be to distribute it as capital,
unless a like contrary intent may be
inferred : In re Barton's Trusts, L. R.,
5 Eq. 238 ; Minot v. Paine et ol., 99
Mass. 101. But in every case the court
will look at the substance of the transaction and not at its form merely.
Where, therefore, a corporation bought
with its surplus profits some of its own
stock which it subsequently apportioned
among its stockholders, it was held that
in substance, 'as well as intent, a cash
bonus had been declared which was to
be considered as income: Leland v.
Hayden, supra;.and where a corporation
declared a cash bonds, and at the same
time authorized the issue of new shares
to an amount equal to the bonus, and
the bonus was actually intended to be
and was applied to payment for the new
shares, it was held that this was substantially the declaration of a stock
dividend, and that the new shares were
to be considered capital: Daland v.
Williams, 101 Mass. 571 ; Heard v.
No definite
Elredge, .109 Mass. 258.
rule can of course be laid down as to
what terms in the resolution declaring
the bonus or dividend, or what attending circumstances will be sufficient
to rebut the ordinary presumption that
cash shall be considered income, and-
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stock capital. Each case depends upon
in Giford v.
its particular facts.
478, where a
Thompson, 115 *ass.
corporation had sold its franchises and
property preparatory to dissolving its
corporate existence, and afterwards
made distribution of all its cash assets
among its stockholders, including a
large amount of profits which Fad accumulated during the existence of a lifetenancy in a portion of its stock, it was
held that it was the clear intent of the
corporation not to make a division of
earnings, profits or income, as such,
but to apportion and distribute all its
property as capital. On the other hand
it was held in Lord v. Brooks, 52 N. H.
72, that where, under similar circumstances, a distribution of the accumulated
profits alone was made, the clear intent of the corporatio.i was to divide
them as income.
(b.) The Cases in Pernsylvania,New
York and Newr Jersey.-These cases proceed substantially upon the principle contended for by the life-tenant in the early
English authorities. Conceding that the
accumulated profits of a corporation remain itsabsolute property until divided,
they nevertheless hold, when once they
are divided, either in the shape of a cash
bonus or a stock dividend, that the
question whether that bojms or dividend
shall be deemed capital or income, depends wholly upon the time when the
profits, out of which it is declared, were
earned. If they were carne I prior to
the inception of the life-tenancy in the
stock, then the bonus or dividend is to
be deemed capital. If, on the contrary,
they were earned during the life-tenancy
or subsequent to the investment in the
stock, then the bonus or dividend is to be
deemed income which properly belongs
to the life-tenant. If they were partly
earned during one period, and partly
during the other, the bonus or dividend
must be divided between capital and income proportionably: Lord v. Brooks,
supra; Simpson v. Moore, 30 Barb. 631 ;

Eaip's Appeal, 4 Casey 368; Van
Doran v. Olden, 4 C. E. Green 176.
See also Woodruff's Estate, I Tuck. 59.
The reasons upon which this principle
rests are set out at length by Lswis, C.
J., in Earp's Appeal, supra. " Where
the profits of a corporation," said lie,
"have
been accumulating for many
years, * * * and the owner dies, directing the ' income' of his estate to be
applied to particular objects for limited
periods, these extraordinary accumulations are as much a part of his capital
as any other part of his estate, and must,
therefore, be regarded as forming a part
of the principal from which the future
income is to arise. * * * The profits
arising since the death of the testator,"
he says, however, "are income. That
sum is the rightful property of the appelThe managers
lants (life tenants).
might withhold the distribution of it for
a time for reasons beneficial to the interests of the parties entitled. But they
could not by any form of procedure
whatever deprive the owners of it. The
omission to distribute it semi-annually,
as it accumulated, makes no change in
The doctrine laid down
its ownership."
in these cases is very far from being a
satisfactory one. If accumulated profits
are, as admitted, wholly the property of
the corporation until divided ; if they
may be expended,' invested, accumuated, retained or distributed precisely
as, and precisely when, the corporation
pleases, how then can it be said that any
to them accrues to any parright or title
ticular stockholder at the period they
are earned, as contradistinguished from
the period when they are divided ? And
what is there, therefore, of solid ground
for the principle on which the cases proceed ?
It may be curious too, to observe,
hereafter, whether the courts will follow
this principle to its logical conclusion.
Suppose 'a bonus declared after the
death of the life-tenant, out of profits
which were partly earned during his
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tenancy, will the executor of the lifetenant be held entitled to recover from

It is, however, clear, that such will
not always be the case. The value of a
share of stock above par does not depend alone upon tile accumulated profits
on band. It depends also, frequently
to a great degree, on the business done
by the corporation, and on tile general
confidence felt by the community in its
management.
These elements must
often make a share of stock worth far
more above par than its per cent. of the
accumulated profits.
When such a state of facts arises it is
impossible to say what course will be
purAued. It may be that the term
"value" employed in the cases will be
explained to mean only what it has
practically meant hitherto, viz., the
capital plus the accumulated profits
divided by the number of shares.
Probably, however, this will not be
the case. A late authority upon an
analogous question hereinafter cited
(Biddle's Appeal, 11 W. N. 0. 244),
seems to point to th" fact that the actual
value at the inception of the tenancy in
the stock, whether produced by the existence of accumulated profits, by the.
profitable business of tile corporation or
by any other cause, will be deemed to
constitute the criterion as to what is
capital which must be maintained Intact. If this be so the value of the
stock as affected by like causes immediately after the declaration of the bonus
or dividend will also have to be taken
into account. How tilis value is to be
determined, it is impossible to say. The
market value clearly furnishes no standard. "That would make the rights of
tile parties depend upon the condition of
the stock market, which is as variable as
the tides without their regularity:" Moss's
Appeal, 2 Norris 264-271. Further
decision is needed upon this point.

the rcmainderman a proportional part
of such bonus ? Proceeding upon strict
principle, he should clearly be held to
be so entitled.
The practical methods adopted by the
courts to effect the necessary appoitionment of the bonus in those cases where
the profits out of which it is declared
have accrued partly prior, and partly
subsequent, to the inception of the lifetenancy have somewhat varied.
In New Jersey the plan pursued is
very simple. The per cent. of accumulated profits to each share at the time of
the inception of the life-tenancy in the
stock is ascertained. The per cent. of
accumulated profits to each share at the
time of instituting the litigation is then
computed. If the latter sum be equal
to or greater than the former, the whole
of tile bonus is awarded to the lifetenant. If it be less, sufficient is deducted from tile bonus to make up the
difference, and this is reinvested as
capital. The balance, if any there be,
goes to the life-tenant: Van Doran v.
Olden, supra.
In Pennsylvania a somewhat different
metlod is adopted. The value of each
share at tile inception of the life-tenancy
in the stock is first ascertained. The
value of each share immediately after tile
issuing of the bonus or stock dividend is
then determined. If the value be less at
the latter time, than at the former,
enough is deducted from the bonus to
make up the difference, and this is
deemed capital. The rest is accounted
income: Rarp's Appeal, supra. No
difficulty has been hitherto experienced
in determining what is the real value of
a share of stock at the respective periods
above mentioned. It has so happened
that its market price above par has been
III. Proceeds of CorporateProperty or
invariably precisely equal to the accu-"anchises.-Where the proceeds of a
mulated profits on hand, divided by the
number of exist'ng shares. The neces- sale of corporate property constitute the
fund out of which a dividend, either
sary computation has been, therefore,
ordinary or extraordinary, is declared
comparatively simple.
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to the stockholders, the question as to
whether that dividend shall be deemed
capital or income is sometimes complicated by considerations other than those
already mentioned. If the property in
question has originally been purchased
3vith profits, the dividends declared from
the proceeds of the sale will of course
be distributed just as dividends.declared
from those profits would have been. If,
on the contrary, the pror erty has been
bought with the capital of the corporation, or has actually formed a part of
that capital, a very different rule applies. Capital remains capital, no matter through how many transmutations it
may pass. Hence property bought with
capital is capital, the proecds of that property are likewise capital, and dividends
declared out of those pro.eeds. must be
deemed and accounted as capital : Heard
v. lredge, 109 Mvass. 258 ; "Wheeler v.
Perry, 18 N. H. 307; Tieton's Appeal, supra. Nor can it make any
difference what the intefir, of the corporation is in declaring thedividend, for
though some authorities hold, as has
been seen, that that intention may be
effectual to transmute income into capital, no case can be found where it has
been deemed effectual to transmute capital into income.
The principle just laid down was
clearly recognised by Lord ELDON in
Barclay v. Wainwrigld, 14 Yes. 66,
and has been enunciated in several
American cases. It applies where the
fund from which the dividenid is declared
has been produced by a sale of part of
the franchises of the corpormtion (Vinton'sAppeal, supra), or where it consists of a reserve which the corporation
has been obliged by law to keep, and
which constitutes "part and parcel of
the capital stock and no part of the
profits or income:" Winslow v. Raven,
cited'52 N. H. 76. It was invokbd too
in Clarkson v. Clarlson, 18 Barb. 646,
under the following circumstances:
Two railway corporations
consoli-

dated, called in the stock of the old
companies

and issued

to the various

stockholders new shares in the consolidated company, equal in number to the
old shares but of a diminished par value.
The difibrence in value between the old
shares and the new was made good by
issuifig the bonds of the consolidated
company for that amount. These bonds
it was held, represented part of the
original capital of the investment, and
must be deemed capital.
A similar conclusion was reached in
Vintoa's Appeal, supra, though it seems to
have escaped the attention of tIme court
that a portion of the property, the proceeds of which were in dispute, had
been bought with the earnings of the
company, and not with its capital. In
the court below this circumstance was
dismissed with the remark that " when
profits are used to extend enterprises of
this kind they become capital," but the
soundness of this doctrine, in view of
the cases already cited, may be doubted.
On principle it would seem that the portion of the fund representing earnings
should be distributed as a bonus declared out of earnings would have been.
The principle above laid down is not,
however, without an exception.
It
sometimes happens that a company is
incorporated for the express purpose of
buying property with its capital, improving it and subsequently selling it at
an advance. In such cases the proceeds
of sales of property, which have constituted part of the capital of the company are frequently on band, and dividends from such funds "are the ordinary ones and the principal ones which
the company may be expected to make :"
Reed v. Head, 6 Allen 174. Such dividends have therefore generally been
considered income: Belch v. Ballet,
10 Gray 402.
The sum received by an insurance
company from a foreign government
under a treaty as compensation for
losses occasioned by that government
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and sustained by the company, is to be
considered as income, and dividends declared out of such fund will be distributed
accordingly : Harvard College v. Amory,
9 Pick. 446. The same doctrine applies
where the fund in question has been
produced by the sale of patent rights
and patterns, the property of a manufacturing corporation: Harvard College
v. Amory, supra.
IV. Options to subscribe to New Stoek.
-When a corporation offers to its shareholders the option of subscribing to new
stock, such stock often becomes at once
in the hands of the subscribers, either by
reason of the existence of a surplus fund,
by reason of the business prospects of
the corporation, or for some other cause,
worth far more than the amount expended for its purchase. For the same
reason the option to subscribe, if sold in
te market, will often realize a considerable sum. Where such an option is
offered during the existence of a lifetenancy, the value of the new stock
above what is paid for it, or, what is
the same thing, the proceeds of the sale
of the option to subscribe to such stock,
has sometimes formed the subject of
litigation between life-tenants and remaindermen.
In MNassachusetts, such
sums are held to be properly capital.
"TThe rigit or privilege to take new
shares in a corporation,'I said BIaLow,
C. J., "is a benefit or interest which
attaches to stock, not as profit or income
derived from the prosecution of the corporate business, but as inherent in the
shares from their very creation. * * *
It is an original incident or attribute
pertaining to each share-a right to a
larger participation or ownership in the
capacity of the corporation to earn
profits, and not the gain or income itself
actually earned by the corporation. In
this view the value of the right must be
regarded as capital :" Atkins v. Albree,
12 Allen 359.
In Pennsylvania-tie only other state
in which the question has arisen-the
VOL. =XX-50

cases have been such as to render it impossible to lay down any broad principle
as a guide for future litigation. In
Ililtbank's Appeal, 14 P. F. Smith 256,
it was held that 1'ithe price brought by
tme sale -of the subscription right, and
the premium of the subscribed stock,
were an incidental, and, in one sense,
an accidental, profit, following the ownership of the old stock, as the product
of an advantage belonging to it," and
it was therefore accounted income.
This case, however, is of little or no
value as a precedent, because it entirely
omits mention of a circumstance which,
owing to the subsequent line of decision,
must inevitably enter as an element into
every future litigation upon the point.
That circumstance is the cause of the
value of the option. That cause may
be, as has been already said, either the
existence of accumulated profits, a confidence in the prosperity and management of the corporation, or both of these
circumstances combined. The former
circumstance alone was considered in
M-loss's Appeal, 2 Norris 264. Here, at
the time the option was offered there
was on hand a large amount of accumulated profits. It did not appear when
those profits -were earned. The market
value of each share of stock above par
immediately before that period happened
to be precisely equal to its per cent. of
the accumulations then on hand. Every
stockholder being given the right to purchase as many of the new shares at par as
he "had of the old, the effect was to
double the number of shares the value
of which was enhanced by the accumulated fund. Hence, each old share was
diminished in value above par by half;
while each new share immediately on
its creation assumed a value above what
was paid for it of the same amount.
This latter value corresponded of course
to the :alue of the option to subscribe to
that share when put upon the market.
It was held that, under the circumstances, the proper course was to con-
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sider the proceeds of these options as
capital, as in this way the corpus of the
estate would be retained intact at precisely the value it had had immediately
prior to the offering of th option.
Both circumstances which give rise
to the value of options were considered
in the recent case of Biddle's Appeal,
supra. Here there was a fund of accumulated profits on hand, all of which
had been earned prior to the inception of the life-tenancy in the stock.
The new shares were offered at par,
each subscriber to pay, in addition, a
sum equal to the par value, which sum
was to be added to the surplus of the
company. The sum rea izcd from the
sale of the option to subscribe to each
new share was greater tha the decreased
percentage of accumulations to that proportion of old shares in right of which
such new share was issued. It was contended on behalf of the life-tenant that
out of that sum sufficient should be capitalized to make up the decreased percentage of the accumulations to the old
shares to what it had been at the time
of the inception of the life-tenancy in
the stock, and that. the rest should be
distributed as income. But the court
held otherwise. The value of the options, they said, was based upon the
right of the new shares to an equal participation in whatever extra value the
old stock might have atta'ned either by
reason of.the accumulations, the business
prospects of the corporation or otherwise.
In other words, the value of those options
was simply a part of the entire value
above par.attained by ite old shares.
The ownership of the proceeds of the
options was therefore to be determined
solely by the ownership of the value
of the old shares above par. If this
was capital, the proceeds of the options
was capital. If it was income, the proceeds of the options was income.
Here that portion of the value of the
old shares above par, derived from accumulations alone, clearly arose prior to

the inception of the life-tenancy in 'the
stock, the accumulations having all been
earned before that period. An extra
value was also presumed to have arisen
from other causes before that time, no
change in the actual value of the stock
having been shown to have occurred

during the life-tenancy. The entire
value of the old stock above par was
thtrefore said to have accrued prior to
the inception of the life-tenancy in the
stock. But this, on the theory of Earp'g
Appeal, supra, constituted that value
capital. -The proceeds of the options
were therefore properly to be considered
capital, and were so decreed.
The decision in this case is by no
means satisfactory. The principle upon
which it depends is substantially that of
Earp's Appeal, already cited, and the
doubts as to the soundness of that principle before expressed might here be
reiterated. It would seem, too, that
certain very important considerations
were entirely overlooked by the court.
The proceeds of the options; or, in
other words, the -value of the new stock
above what was .iaid for it, did not depend wholly upon the antecedent value
of the old stock above par. A portion
of that value resulted from the right of
the new stock to share ratably with the
old in the addition to the surplus produced by the payment by each subscriber
thereto of the extra sum equal to the par
value. But of this fact the court took
no notice.
Other difficulties might be slggested.
The very fact of increasing the capital
may in itself have communicated an enhanced value to the new stock in common with the old, and so have raised
the price of the option. Or perhaps that
price was enormously enhanced by some
temporary and wholly artificial "boom"
in the market. The increase of value
brought about by such causes would
seem to be clearly in the nature of profit
accruing during the life-tenancy, and
should have been considered income.
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No opportunity was, however, afforded
to determine whether any, and. if any
how much, of the value of the option
was attributable to such causes. The
whole of that value was deemed to arise
out of the former value of the old shares,
and was distributed accordingly.
The only rule that can safely be deduced from liddle's Appeal as obtaining
in Pennsylvania is as follows: Whereever an option to subscribe to new stock
is offered, and the valie attained by the
,old stock above par is shown to have
remained unaltered from the time of the
inception of the life-tenancy in the stock
down to the offering of the option, then
the value of the new stock above what
is paid for it, or the proceeds of the
option to subscribe to it, will be deemed
capital. But if, on the other hana, the
total value of the old stock above par
can be shown to have been caused by
the accumulation of a fund or from other
circumstances arising since the inception
of the life-tenancy in the stock, then the
value of the new stock above what is

paid for it, or the proceeds of the option
to subscribe to it, will be deemed income.
Where the value of the old stock above
par has been caused by reason of accumulations or other circumstances happening partly prior and partly subsequent to the inception of the life-tenancy
in the stock, the value of the new stock
above what is paid for it, or the proceeds
of the option to subscribe to it, would
seem, on principle, to be properly distributable to capital and to income proportionately. How the necessary computation will be made remains yet to be
decided. In loss's Appeal the question
was evaded, because the exact period
when the accumulations were earned
was not shown, and the total proceeds
of the options were accordingly awarded
arbitrarily to capital. But the day is
not far distant when the question will
have to be faced. The test of market
values has been most properly repudiated. What test will be adopted ?
LAWRENCE: LEWIS, JR.

United States Circuit Court. Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
NORRINGTON v. WRIGHT.
Under a contract for 5000 tons of rails to be shipped in about equal quantities in
February and four succeeding months, the whole to be delivered by August 1st, the
purchaser may rescind on failure to ship the stipulated quantity in February.
A sexerable contract may be severed for the purpose of enforcing rights as they
accrue, but a party in default cannot insist on its being treated as severed to avoid
a right to rescind for non-performance of any one portion.
Partial performance, accepted and retained in ignorance of any default of the
seller as to ie residue, does not prevent the right of rescission for such residue
when the contract furnishes an exact measure of compensation for the partial performance.

MOTION to take off nonsuit.

The action was assumpsit on the

following contract:

"Philadelphia, January 19th 1880.
Sold to Messrs. Peter Wright & Sons, for account of Messrs. A.
Norrington & Co., London, 5000 tons old T iron rails, for ship-
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ment from a European port or ports at the rate of about 1000 tons
per month, beginning February 1880, but whole contract to be
shipped before August 1st 1880, at $45 per ton of twenty-two
hundred and forty pounds custom-house weight, ex ship Philadelphia. Settlement cash, on presentation of bills accompanied
by custom-house certificates of weight. Sellers to notify buyers
of shipments, with vessels named, as soon as known by them.
Sellers not to be compelled to replace any parcel lost after shipment. Sellers, when possible, to secure to buyers right to name
discharging berth of vessels at Philadelphia."
Three counts set out the contract and averred performance in its
terms, i.e., a shipment of about 1000 tons in January, February,
&c., with averment of arrival, tender, and refusal to accept. The
fourth count it was admitted was not proved.
On the trial, the plaintiffs proved shipments were made in February, 395 tons; March, 897 tons; April, 1349 tons; May, 1099
tons; June, 991 tons; July, 306 tons.
The 395 tons shipment arrived, was delivered, and paid for.
In May, before the arrival of the other cargoes, the defendants,
having ascertained the amounts that had been shipped in February
and March, thereupon gave notice of rescission, and declined to
accept any shipments as they arrived and were tendered.
It appeared that defendants at the time of receiving the first cargd,
did not know of plaintiffs default in making the shipments.
'At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the court, McKENNAN and
BUTLER. JJ., being of opinion that defendants had the right to
rescind the contract, plaintiffs elected to suffer a nonsuit, with leave
to move to take it off. The present motion was then made.
Samuel Diclksonv and J. C. Bullitt, for the motion.
R. C. Xcllurtrie, contra
The Judges delivered oral opinions as follows:
BUTLER, J.-To justify an allowance of the motion we must be
convinced that our ruling at the trial was wrong. We are not so
convinced. The motion must, therefore, be dismissed.
For myself, however, I may say that I regard the point as involved in serious doubt; not so much when considered on general
principles, as when viewed in the light of modern decisions. The
right to rescind a contract for non-performance is a remedy as old
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as the law of contract itself. Where the contract is entire-indivisible-the right is unquestioned. The undertakings on the
one side, and on the other, are dependent, and performance by one
party cannot be enforced by the other without performance, or a
tender of performance, on his own part. In the case befbre us the
But to say it is "severable," does not
contract is "severable."
advance the plaintiffs' argument. A "severable" contract, as the
language imports, is a contract liable simply to be severed. In its
origin, and till severed, it is entire-a single bargain, or transaction. The doctrine of severableness (if I may be allowed to coin
a word), in contracts is an invention of the courts, in the interests
of justice, designed to enable one who has partially performed, and
is entitled on such partial performance to something from the other
side, to sustain an action, in advance of complete performance-as
where goods are sold to be delivered and paid for in parcels, to
enable the seller to recover for the parcels delivered, in advance of
completing his undertaking. But this equitable doctrine should
not be invoked by one who had failed to perform, for the purpose
of defeating the other's right to rescind, and thus to protect himself against the consequences of his own wrong. As against such
a party the contract should be treated, and enforced, as entire.
To say, therefore, that the contract is "severable," does not, I
repeat, advance the argument. To render the plaintiff's position
logical, it is necessary to take a step forward, and hold that such a
transaction (it would not be accurate in this view to call it a contract), constitutes several distinct, independent contracts. Then,
of course, it follows that a failure, as respects one of several successive deliveries, affords no right to rescind in regard to those yet
to be made. And this step, after much apparent doubt and hesitation, the English courts have taken. It was the necessary outgrowth of the decision in Simpson v. Crippen, which overruled
Hfoare v. Rennie. In our own country the cases are inharmonious,
and the question unsettled. After a careful examination of what
has been said on the subject, I shall not be surprised if the courts
here finally adopt the present English rule, and thus substitute
compensation in damages for the remedy by rescission to the
extent there done. I say this, however, not because I think it
wise to adopt this rule, but because of an apparent leaning in that
direction.
The question, however, as here presented, is properly for the
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Supreme Court, to which I hope it may be carried, and the rule
thus be settled.
MCKENNAN,

J.-I

concur even more decidedly.

I am not

satisfied that the weight of the opinions, even in England, is with
these decisions. So far as this country is concerned it cannot be
said there is any such rule. I have such doubt of the justice of
the rule that I am not willing to take this step forward. It is
more respectful to remit this to the Supreme Court, and, therefore,
I do not feel disposed to take the advanced step.
Motion dismissed.
As will be seen by the opinions in
the principal case, great doubt was
experienced by the court as to the correctness of the decision arrived at.
This doubt was the natural result of
the conflict of authority upon the point,
a conflict, however, genecally more apparent than real. The question is one
of great interest, and its proper determination is of the highest importanoo to the
commercial and mercantile world, In
delivering the opinion of the court in
Ligget v. Smith, 3 Watts 332, the late
Chief Justice Ginsox began by saying:
" Previous to the decision of Boone v.
Lyre, 1 H. Bl. 273 (note a), it seems
to have been taken that nothing less
than entire performance of a mutual
covenant would entitle a party to his
action for a breach on the other side.
In that case, however, -. more reasonable and just rule was adopted, by
which a mutual or dependent covenant
which goes but to a part of the consideration on both sides, and whose breach
may be compensated in damages, is to
be treated exactly as if it were separate
and independent. This is distinctly the
principle, and has been established by a
train of decisions both in Elngland and
this country which it is unnecessary to
quote."
The case of Boone v. Eyre,
supra, was this : Plaintiff conveyed to
defendant the equity of rsdemption of a
plantation in the West Indies, together
vitli the stock of negroes upon it, in

consideration of 5001., and an annuity
of 1601. for life, and covenanted that he
had a good title to the plantation, was
lawfully possessed of the negroes, and
that the defendant should quietly enjoy.
The defendant covenanted that, the
plaintiff well and truly performing all
and everything therein contained on his
part to be performed, the defendant
would pay the annuity. The action
was covenant, the breach assigned being
the non-payment of the annuity. Plea,
that the plaintiff had no good title to the
negroes to convey. Demurrer to the
plea, and judgment thereon for the
plaintiff, upon the principle recited in
Ligget v. Smith, supra; Lord M.&.tsFIELD pithily remarking, that to hold
otherwise would make the failure of the
plaintiff's property in one negro a bar to
the action. So that it results from this,
that recovery can be had, even on contracts in consideration of performance,
when the part broken on one side does
not go to the entire consideration. But
where covenants are mutually. dependent, the one upon the other, there must
be performance by one party before suit
can be maintained for a breach by the
other. Pordage v. Cole, I Wins. Saunders (Sir E. V. Williams's ed.) 548, is a
strong example of the same tendency, that
is, to hold either partybound to a performance of his part of the contract unless he
can show the absolute interdependence
of the two covenants or contracts. So,
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in Fotherqill v. Walon, 8 Taunt. 576,
where tile contract was a charter party
between ship owners and freighters, and
the ship owner covenanted to take on
board six pipes of brandy at Havre, and
therewith proceed to Terceira, and there
take on board a casgo of fruit or other
goods, as the freighters might think fit,
and proceed to London or Bristol as
might he ordered by tile freighters, and
there make a true and right delivery of
the fruit, and the freighters covenanted
to pay freight for the fruit and brandy,
the freight of the brandy, &c., to be
taken out in fruit at Terceira, and guaranteed the ship a full cargo home, it was
held that the agreement to take brandy
to Terceira was not a condition precedent, but a distinct and independent
covenant. And, the action being against
the freighters for not putting on a full
cargo at Terceira, the owners having
averred generally performance, a demqrrer to the declaration was overruled.
This case is an instructive example, and
the arguments of counsel show clearly
what was at that time the understanding
of the profession upon the point. In
support of the demurrer, LENs, Serjt.,
argued, that an averment of general
performance was not enough; that the
defendants would have been able to
barter the brandy for the return cargo of
fruit, but that they were unable to get the
full cargo because of the plaintiff's failure. He was asked by DALLAS, C. J.,
the awkward question, whether, if the
plaintiff had omitted wilfully to get more
than five tierces of brandy when he
might have had six, the defendant
(" plaintiff" in the text, but evidently
a mistake) would have been discharged ?
It was answered, that then the plaintiff
must have averred that no more was
Serjt., contra,
to be had. VAUGnAN,
justly pronounces this unsound, and
says that if the delivery of the brandy
was a condition precedent, the carrying
of five instead of six tierces would not
suffice, and the plaintiff could not re-

cover.

He cites Storer v. Gordon, 3 M.

& S. 308, a very analogous case. In
reply, LENs, Serjt., admitted, that if
the homeward voyage did not grow out
of the outward voyage, the defendant
must fail, and fail le did. The law was
clearly expounded in a short opinion by
DALLAS, C. J., and the doctrine therein
laid down is said to have all the weight
which some of the greatest names
in Westminster Hall can give it. See
also the opinions of LAwnExcE and
LE BLANC, JJ., in Glazebrook-v. Woodrow, 8 T. R. 366, acase very analogous
to, and somewhat stronger than, Fothergill v. 117alton is Storer v. Gordon, supra.
Numerous other cases might be mentioned. The principle enunciated in
Fothergill v. Walton is familiar to all
the early decisions, and was affirmed
with a few apparent exceptions, until
the case of Hoare v. Rennie, 5 H.
& N. 19; s. c. 29 L. J. (Ex.) 73,
which is a very important case, and
The
deserves careful consideration.
case was this: Defendants bought of
plaintiffs 667 tons of Swedish iron; said
iron to be shipped from Sweden in the
months of June, July, August and September, in about equal portions each
month, at a fixed price per ton delivered
in London. Plaintiff shipped only 21
tons in June, which arrived in July.
Defendants refused to accept the iron,
and gave notice of rescission, and the
plaintiff then brought suit upon the contract. It was held by the whole court
that the defendants had tile right to rescind. No authotity is cited by any of
the learned barons in support of their
opinions, and only one or two cases
mentioned, and the greatest light thrown
upon the decision, is from a remark of
PoLnocx,B. (L. J., 29 Ex. 77) : "The
question is one of law for the court under
all the circumstances of the case, but
where parties have made an agreement
the court ought not to make another
agreement for them merely because of
laxity in the terms of the agreement."
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Certainly it was a cast' in which the

that the plaintiff's conduct amounted to

plaintiff was entitled to but little consideration; his first shipment had been
grossly incomplete and had arrived late,
and lie had made no offer or tender of
It
the subsequent monthly shipments.
must also be remembered that the action
was for a refusal to accept the incomplete first shipment, and it might very
reasonably be urged that ,tvile an incomplete shipment in June would not excuse
the defendants from accepting a proper
shipment in July, yet they could not be
compelled to accept aportion of any one
entire shipment. Moreover, as noticed
in Freethv. Burr, hfra, a shipment of so
small a portion might have been considered a complete breach by anticipation. Hoarev. Renne, supra, however,
even with its peculiar circumstances,
did not find favor with the courts in
In
J7onassoli v.
subsequent cases.
Young, 32 L. J. Q. B. 3885, CnomPTOX, J., says, in differently deciding an
analogous case, that in Hoare v. Benie,

an abandonment of the contract. According to the English practice, the
defendant then took a rule nis. The
facts were, that a quantity of iron was
to be delivered in two shipments, the
first in two weeks, the second in four
weeks, to be paid for two weeks- after
each delivery. The first delivery was
not completed for six months. Plaintiffs, the vendees, refused to pay, claiming to set off the damages for delay, but
This
demanded the second delivery.
being refused, suit was brought. Counsel appearing against the rule were
stopped by the court, although Hoare v.
Bennie was cited and argued from at
length by the other side. Lord COLEconcurred in by
RIDGE'S opinion,
Justices KEArING and DEN.IrAN, is
certainly entitled to very great weight.
In Boper v. Johnson, L. R., 8 C. P.
167, 172, Simpson v. Crippin is considered as settling the law. Even the
cases which recognise Hoare v. Bennie,
of which Bradford v. Williams, L. R.,
7 Ex. 259, is one, do so upon the special
circumstances of the case, recognising
the true rule, namely, that in every case
the intention of the parties as gathered

the court mst have considered time as
of the essence of the contract. And this
is indicated by the remarx of PoLLocK,
C. B., quoted supra. In Simpson v.
8 Q. B. 14, where the
Crippin, L. i,
facts were very similar to those in Hoare
v. Rennie, that case was practically overruled, the judges, BLACKBuN, MNELLOR
and LusH, declaring themselves unable
to understand it; Lusir, J., saying, as
above, that time must have been considered of the essence of the contract.
And in Freeth v. Burr, L. I3., 9 C. P.
208, the court says that Hoare v.
Bennie, is to be supported on the
ground that there was a prospective
abandonment of the contract by the
plaintiffs. The action of the court in
bi-eeth v. Burr, shows how well satisfied
its' members were of the general rule.
The question came before them thus :
At the trial, before BRETT, J., lie directed a verdict for the plaintiff, subject
to the defendant's right to move for a
nonsuit, if the court were of opinion

It
from the contract must govern.
would be useless to multiply authorities
in England. The great weight of authority there is clearly against the rule
adopted in the principal case. A very
recent case, however, boucl v. Muller,
L. R., 7 Q. B. -Div. 92, is undoubtedly
an authority the other way ; this decision is so important and extraordinary, that it deserves careful consideration. The defendant, in October 1879,
sold to the plaintiff 2000 tons of pig
iron, to be delivered in November
in November,
1879, or, "equally
December and January next," at 6d.
Plaintiff failed to take any
per ton.
iron in November, but claimed the
December and January deliveries. The
defendants declined to make the two last
deliveries, and gave notice that they
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considered the contract cancelled by the
plaintiff's failure to take the November
delivery. It was held, reversing the
court below, that the defendant's refusal
was justifiable. From this judgment,
BRnT, L. J., dissents. The contract,

does not buy any parcel of 666 tons, any
more than where a suit of clothes is sold
there is a separate sale of coat, waistcoat
and trousers. The vigorous and logical
dissent of BnETT, L. J., will repay
careful perusal. And the whole case,
as stated by BAGALLP, L. J., is sus- carefully read, will be seen to be against
ceptible of three constructions : 1. That the principal case, the concluding rerelied on by the plaintiffs, that, unless mark of Lord Justice BRAArwELL, just
lie elected to take all in November, the quoted, evidencing the entirely erroneous
contract was for equal portions in three view held by him. Surely it requires
months. 2. That relied on by the de- no argument to show the difference befendant, that the plaintiff was hound to tween the purchase of trousers, coat and
make his election in November, and vest, together forming a suit, and the
communicate it to the defendant, in purchase of iron, as in the principal
order that the defendant might be able case, or even in Houck v. Muller, where,
to deliver ie whole or one-third, as the the plaintiff's position was weaker.
case might be, in that month. .3. An HJ'oare v. .Rennie, the reliance of the
alternative suggestion by the defendant, court, has been said to have the
that the plaintiff was to take the whole "weight of authority largely opposed
2000 tons in November, unless he gave to it" in the notes to Cutter v. Powdl
notice to the defendant that he elected to (RussELL, Q. C., arg., L. R., 7 Q. B.
have the cargo delivered in three equal D. 97).- See, also, 15 Am. L. Rev.
687, for the true ground, we may say
portions. BR.uxInVELL and BAUALLEY,
L. 3"., concur in holding the second the only ground, on which Houck v.
view of the contract to be the true one, Muller can be sustained, namely, that
and that in that or the third view the of prospective refusal, or complete breach
plaintiff had no case. But for the sake by anticipation.
of argument, they take the plaintiff's
Coming now to this side of the
construction, and even then, following Atlantic, we find it stated by Mr. ParHoare v. Rennie,'their judgment is the sons (2 Contracts *517) that, "If the
same; Lord BA3nw rL admits, how- part to be performed by one party conever, as the authorities compel him, that sists of several distinct items, and the
if the second delivery and not thefirst, price -to be paid by the other is apporhad been refused, there would have been tioned to each item to be performed, or
no right to rescind. He goes on to say is left to be implied by law, such a
somewhat mournfully, "Suppose the contract will generally be held severable;
November delivery would have been a * * * but if the consideration to be paid
profit to the defendant, and the De- is single and entire, the contract will be
cember and January deliveries a loss, held to be entire, although the subject
why is lie to bear the loss and have no of the contract may consist of several
security that he will get the profit ? distinct and wholly independent items."
This reasoning would, nb doubt, apply This statement has been judicially apwhere there is part performance, but. proved in several cases, and it is conthen there is no help for it. It is asked ceived to be a very correct presentation
whether every trifling breach of contract of the law.
is attended with this consequence. I
The rule plainly deducible from the
know not. But 666 tons out of 2000 Pennsylvania cases is, that a partial
are not a trifle." He concludes with failure to perform any part of a conthe remark, that in such a case the buyer tract will not deprive a party of the
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right to recover for work already done
under it, or for the refusal of the other
party to continue it, unless the breach is
one which goes to the entire consideration,
and it is evident that the contract would
not have been entered into except in
view of complete performance. It is
not the multiplicity of item; in a contract
which determines its severable or nonseverable character ; but it is its object.
It has been held very frequently and
with great reason, that the effect of a
breach of a severable coLtract may be
set off by the defendant in suits like the
principal case, and deducted from the
damages recovered, as such breach
would manifestly give him a right to
But this is altogether different
sue.
from preventing a party to a contract.
from recovering at all for work already
done, or which lie has offered to do,
under the contract. No cne is injured
by this rule. The whole intent and
purpose of the law in cases of this kind
is to do exact justice between the
parties; and if the loss cccasioned by
the partial failure can be recouped by
the defendant, there can be no con.ceiyable reason for allowing him to
escape. performance of his part of the
The case of Obermyer v.
contract.
Vichols, 6 Bin. 159, is an early illustration of the point in Pennsylvania.
In that case there was a lease of a
mill, with a covenant on the part of
the lessor to put up improvements.
The improvements were not put up, but
the rent of the mill was recovered nevertheless-the failure did not go to the
The defendant
whole consideration.
was allowed to set off his loss by the
non-erection of the improvements. The
dislike to the idea of the exoneration of
one party by the partial failure of the
other, is strongly instanced in Ligget v.
Smith, 3 Watts 331, where the plaintiff
had agreed to build a warehouse and
use certain mortar in its construction.
Mortar was not used according to the
contract, but it was held that this did

not constitute an entire defence to an
action on the contract, but that the defendant might set off whatever damage
he had sustained. Of the later cases,
S inn v. Bodine, 10 P. F. Smith 182, is
instructive. The contract was: "'We
accept your offer for 800 tons coal at
$6.12J, per ton of 2240 pounds. Coal
to be delivered as sent for during the
months of August and September.
Should we be unable to get all away
by close of September, it is understood
you can keep on wharf or bring down
later, as you prefer, as much as 300
tons." One cargo was delivered under
this contract, and payment therefor demanded and refused. The defendants
then declined delivering any more coal,
and the plaintiff then brought suit
on the contract. The defendants requested the court to charge that the
plaintiff's default in not paying excused
them from further delivery. This was
declined, on the ground that the consideration was entire, and there was no
severance in it, and, therefore, the
plaintiff was really in no default. Unless considered carefully, this case is
It
liable to grave misinterpretation.
would seem to decide that severable contracts may be rescinded, and not entire
contracts, whereas the reverse is certainly more nearly true as a general
proposition. It will be observed that
Sdnn v. Bodine was almost the converse
of the principal case. Instead of a suit
for a refusal to accept part performance
of the contract on one side, it was a suit
to recover damages for failure to continue performance on the other. The
defendants claimed to rescind. Under
Withers v. Reynol)s, 2 B. & Ad. 882,
the plaintiff's conduct, had the contract
been severable, would have amounted to a
complete breach by anticipation, which,
as noticed in Freethv. Burr, supra, gives
the right to rescind even such contracts.
But as the contract was entire, there
being no evidence of severance in the
payments, there was no breach by the

NORRINGTON v. WRIGHT.
plaintiff and, of course, the defendants
were liable. The case is very far from
deciding that, had there been a severable
contract, and only afailure to make one
payment, not a prospective refusal to pay
at all, the defendants would have been
excused from further performance. This
is shown to be the true meaning of the
case by the subsequent rulings of the
same court. In Lucesco Oil Co. v.
Brewer, 16 P. F. Smith 352, Parsons's
statement of the law is approvingly
cited. A very strong case is Morgan v.
McKee, 27 P. F. Smith 228. Defendants bought 4000 barrels of oil from the
plaintiffs, and eight similar papers of the
same date were executed to them, each
for the delivery of 500 barrels a month,
cash on delivery. Plaintiffs, on demand, refused to deliver the oil on one
of the appointed days. The defendant,
on the next day for delivery, gave notice
of rescission on the ground of the previous default. It was held that the
plaintiff might recover for the refusal of
the defendant to accept and pay for the
oil subsequently tendered at the appointed times. Mr. Justice WILLIAMS,
in delivering the opinion of the court,
pronounces the contract beyond question
severable, and says that the plaintiff's
failure to deliver once did r.ot exonerate
the defendants from accepting and paying for the future deliveries, and did
not, per se, end the contract, though it
doubtless gave the defendants a right to
recoup whatever loss the breach had
occasioned them, and continues : "If it
gave defendants a right to rescind, they
should have exercised it promptly,"
and decides against them on the ground
that at all events they had waited too
long. No matter what the contract, if
the defendants intend rescinding, they
must act promptly. It will be observed
that the learned judge does not decide in
express terms either for or against the
right to rescind ; but it is conceived that
the implication is against it. Even if
a contract is entire, there must be

reasonable diligence in exercising the
right of rescission. And ifthe delay were
the sole reason for the decision, the court
were at useless pains to show the contract severable. The true meaning of
the opinion is, that a partial failure of
performance by one party does not, in
such cases, release the other party from
his obligations. See, also, the remarks
of Mri. Justice TauNiy, in Scott v.
Kittanning Coal Co., 8 'orris 232, 238.
Graver v. Scott, 30 P. F. Smith 88,
clearly indicates that, in the absence of
proof of the interdependence of the parts
of such a contract, it will be considered
severable, and, therefore, a breach will
not excuse the other party from further
See, also, Stoddart v.
performance.
Saith, 5 Binn. 355. Quigley v. De
Haas, 1 Norris 267, decides that contracts
of this nature are primafacie severable,
but that where it can be shown that such
was not the intention of the parties, they
will be construed entire.
Cases in other states bear out the
same doctrine. We may refer in New
York to Snook v. Fries, 19 Barb.
313. The agreement was for the
manufacture of several thousand bricks
during the season of 1853, at so much
per thousand, to be paid for as fast
as burned. After burning one kiln,
plaintiff deliberately abandoned the
contract, and sued for what he had
done. The defence was, that the contract had been abandoned; it was held
that 'this did not end it, but that the
defendants might bring a cross suit.
So that while the contract subsists,
either party may recover upon it for
performance, and by necessary implication for an offer to perform, being in
turn liable to account in damages for
partial or defective performance. So,
in Swjft v. Opdyke, 43 Barb. 274, where
the agreement was by parol for twentytwo bales of blankets expected to arrive
in two shipments, of eight and fourteen
respectively. Seven bales arrived, were
delivered, and suit was brought for their
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value. The plaintiff recovered. The
contract was held to be severable, and it
was said that to justify the other construction the inference must be uinmistakable-it would impos3 on the plaintiff a heavy forfeiture. And in Talmage
v. White, 3 Jones & Spencer 218, we
find the following language: "If one
order three parcels of goods at a certain
prihe, and one be sent and accepted, lie
cannot refuse to accept the others, it
stamps the contract as several for each
parcel." This principle, which it is
conceived the cases abundantly bear out,
is in direct conflict with the principal
case. It clearly shows that the contract
there was "several for each parcel,"
for by its very terms it is just such a
contract. The various shiiments were
to be severally accepted and paid for.
In Tieton v. Feitner, 2!(0N. Y. 423,
Judge DEnio, in delivering the opinion
of the court, said: "The position that
one who has violated a contract on his
part, cannot recover for the breach of
any of his stipulations by the other party
cannot be sustained."
He then distinguishes cases where the consideration
is evidently entire in tbe minds of the
parties, and further remarks : "The
law no doubt intends to discourage people from breaking their engagements,
but this is not generally accomplished by
visiting them with a penalty beyond the
damages sustained by the party injured."
See, also, in New York, Pattridge v.
Gildermeister, I Keyes 93. Per Lee v.
Beebe, 13 Hun 89 ; Sicels v. Pattson,
14 Wend. 257.
The law in Massachusetts is well illustrated by the two cases of New.on v. Vinchester, 16 Gray 208, and Winchester v.
Newton, 2 Allen 492. The same parties
were concerned in both cases. The facts
were as follows: On 27f May 1857, the
plaintiff, in the first cae, agreed with
the defendant, in writing, to deliver all
the oak timber standing on certain wood
lots prior to April 1st 1858, at $6 per
cord. Payments, six months after de-

livery. By. an endorsement on the
agreement, the plaintiff, in February
1858, at the defendant's request, agreed
to postpone until April 1st 1859, the
delivery of all the timber, "excepting
what is now put on cars, being four car
loads, and about ten cords at Marlborough depot, which is subject to the
depot master's order for delivery," and
also " about thirty-five cords cut."
The four car loads, &c., were duly
delivered, and in October par of the
price was paid. None of the rest of the
lumber was ever delivered. The suit
was brought in February 1859, to recover the balance of the price of the
delivered lumber. The defence was,
that nothing was due until all was
delivered. The court thought otherwise, and gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the original, entire
contract was severed by the endorsement. In the second case, the position
of the parties was reversed. Before the
commencement of the former action,
Winchester had notified Newton that he
would pay no more until the entire
contract was fulfilled. After receiving
this refusal, Newton delivered no more
timber, and the present action was
brought to recover for his failure to do
so. The judgment was for the plaintiff,
the court holding that the contract was
severed as before. It was said in the
opinion of the court that, "In regard to
each portion a distinct liability attached
to the parties."
The doctrine of Withers v. Reynolds, was shown to be that
of prospective refusal, and it was said,
finally; that "The refusal to pay for the
timber that had been delivered on October Ist1858, did not operate to discharge the other party from his promise
to deliver timber April 1st 1859."
And in the opinion of the court iii
Miner v. Bradley, 22 Pick. 459-60,
there is a very clear indication that such
a contract is practically made up of
several and distinct agreements.
In Maine, the case of Dwinel v. How-

NORRINGTON v. WRIGHT.
ard, 30 Me. 258, cited by the. defendant
in the principal case, demands special
attention. The defendants agreed to
deliver to the plaintiff all the ice at
certain places at so much per ton.
Payment, $500 on the execution of the
contract, to be applied in payment for
the last ice received. Balance, onehalf in thirty, one-half in sixty days.
Or, if any of the ice was taken away
sooner, cash on- delivery. The "sixty
days" payment not having been made,
both before and after it fell due the
defendants refused to deliver aiy more
unless paid cash for it. Part of the ice
remaining undelivered, the plaintiff sued
on the contract for damages. The judgment was for the defendant, on two
grounds: 1. That they had a right to
insist on cash payment, and were not
bound to continue delivering when it
was refused. 2. That even if they had
by their former deliveries waived this
right, the plaintiff, to be entitled to
exact performance of the residue, should
have paid the price within sixty days as
agreed. The case is so plainly distinguishable from the principal case
that extended comment is unnecessary.
In the first place, it is very questionable
whether the contract was not entire ;
and in the second place, by its very
terms, payment was to be cash' on
delivery, or absolute within a certain
time; and there was no evidence of
willingness on the part of the plaintiff
to pay in either way. So in Haines v.
Tucker, 50 N. H. 309, where the judgment was put upon the express ground
that the refusal to accept the malt was
unqualified and a clear renunciation of
the contract: in the course of its opinion,
the court says: "If, on the trial, the
jury should find that the refusal of the
defendants did not amount to a renunciation of the contract by them, and
that what occurred on that day, together
with the defendant's previous conduct,
was not sufficient to justify the plaintiffs, as reasonable men, in the conclu-

sion that the defendants did not intend
to fulfil, and would not do so, then it
would be necessary for the plaintiffs to
hold themselves in readiness to perform,
and a further performance might, perhaps, have been required."
In Tyson
v. Doe, 15 Vt. 571, it is said tbA, " So
long as a contract by its terms remains
executory, it may be rescinded, or put
an end to, in various ways. This may
sometimes be done in virtue of a right
expressly reserved to one party alone,
or to each of the parties. So the contrct may be subject to some express or
implied condition, the non-performance
of which will annul it, at the election of
the party entitled to insist on the condition."
See, also, in that state,
Keenan v. Brown, 21 Vt. 86; Gallup
v. Burnell, Brayt. 191 ; Taylor v. Gallup, 8 Vt. 340; Fletcher v. Cole, 23 Id.
114. So, also, in New Jersey, the
question of a vendor's right to rescind
was held to depend upon whether a
contract is or is not entire: Thompson
v. Conover, 3 Vroom 466. In North
Carolina, there is the case of Homesley
v. Elias, 75 N. C. 564, where it is said
that the plaintiff might have rescinded ;
but there was a prospective abandonment of the contract by the defendant.
In Alabama, the tendency is against the
principal case: Kirkland v. Oates, 25
Ala. 465 ; Drake v. Goree, 22 Id. 409,
415. And in Mississippi, it is held that
a failure of a party to comply with a
portion of the stipulations of an agreement, is no ground for a rescission of the
whole contract, so as to deprive him of
rights secured to him by the other provisions contained in it, and which are
wholly independent of those in which he
has made default: Dunlap v. Petrie, 35
Miss. 590. In Kentucky, the cases of
Trimble v. Green, 3 Dana 357, and
Hewitt v. Berryman, 5 Id. 165, serve
well to illustrate the law. In the former, a case of condition precedent,
where the consideration was a covenant
and also a performance, it was sought
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to maintain that, the performance not
going to the entire consideration, but
the covenant forming )art of it, the
failure to perform might be recouped in
damages. But this vice, was not satisfactory to the court. I was held that
the performance was a condition precedent to recovery, and that without it
in such cases, there could only be a recovery where the defendant had received
some benefit wich it would be inequitable to allow him to retain ; and Pordage
y. Cole, or rather the notes to it, the
court criticises and disapproves. But
in Hewitt v. Berryman, there was one
contract containing several -stipulations,
and the following language is used by the
court: "Though the contract between
Hewitt and Felix is one and entire
[this word is not used technically here],
it contains seyeral distinct and independent covenants on the part of each,
which are not made to depend upon "the
performance of the whole of the covenants in the entire contract, on either
side." It is added, that if suit had
been brought for the breach of one stipulation, it surely would not be contended
that the plaintiff must aver performance
of all his part of the contract. All that
is necessary is the performance of what
relates to the particular act in question.
The Iowa cases are to the same effect:
Duiol v. Minott, 9 Iowa 403; MfcDoniels
v. Whitney, 38 Id. 60. Robson v.
-Bohn, 27 Minn. 333, 346, closely resembles Dwinel v. Howard, supra, and
serves to explain it, as above. Nothing
could be more explicit than the language
of the court in Sawyer v. Railroad Co.,
22 Wis. 403. It is not necessary to
recite the facts of that case ; they are
not in point, although the question under
discussion was involved. The court
says : "Was such delivery and receipt
of payment a waiver of the condition of
payment down for the first hundred
barrels according to agreement? Did
the plaintiff thereby ratify the entire
agreement, so that he could not after-

wards rescind as to the one hundred
barrels of which Mr. Tilton had thus
obtained wrongful possession? * * * I
think the plaintiff waived none of his
legal rights (arising out of the wrongful
delivery or taking of the first one hundred barrels). I think so, because I
think the agreement divisible. It was
for the sale of 300 barrels of flour at $8,
in lots of 100 barrels, cash on delivery.
It u' s in legal effiect the same as f there
had been three contracts for the sale and
delivery of one hundred barrels of flour
each. See, also, in the same state, and
to the same effect, Goodwin v. Merrill,
13 Wis. 658. The court said in Allen
v. McKibben, 5 Mich. 454, "Where a
party fails to comply substantially with
his agreement, unless it is apportionable,
the rule is well settled, that he can not
sue upon the agreement or recover upon
it at all." And in Norrisv. Harris, 15
Cal. 227, it was held, that the partial
failure of performance of a severable
contract did not entitle the other party
to a rescission of the whole contractparts of it might be rescinded which
were entire in themselves. (See pp.
256-7.) And it has been held in many
cases besides those already cited, that a
contract of this kind is practically made
up of several distinct agreements : Coleman v. Hudson, 2 Sneed 463; Cole v.
Cheovenda, 4 Col. 17 ; More v. Bonnet,
40 Cal. 251 ; Patrdy v. Bullard, 41 Id.
444 ; Loomis v. Bank of Rochester, 10
Ohio St. 327 ; Kennedy v. Schwartz, 13
Nev. 229 ; Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Ald.
567. An important point to be observed
is, that where the contract is severable,
recovery is allowed on the contract,.not
on a quantum valebat. As to when the
latter, an implied contract, can be sued
upon in such cases, there seems to be
some little differences among the authorities, but the rule may, probably, be
stated as follows : Where the contract
is entire, and a benefit has been received
under it, if one party break it he may
still recover on a quantum valebat, a new
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contract being implied from the retention of the benefit, and the measure of
damages being no longer the original
contract price. The original contract is
destroyed by the breach ; but this is not
true of a severable contract, and, therefore, the recovery is upon the contract
itself. As to quantum valebat, see cases
already cited, and Liggit v. Smith, 3
Watts .331. Also, notes to Cutter v.
Powell, 2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 18. It only
remains to notice the few cases which
sustain, or seem to sustain, the principal
case. They are Bradley v. King, 44 Ill.
339 ; Catlin v. Tobias, 26 N. Y. 217;
Smith v. Lewis, 40 Ind. 98, and King
Philip's Mills v. Slater, 12 R. I. 82.
The first case, carefully read, will be
seen to have been one of prospective
refusal. The terms were cash on delivery of each parcel, and the vendee
accepted a parcel and refused to pay
cash for it; and this refusal was based
upon a claim to set off damages caused
by a previous default of the vendors.
So that it was a denial of the obligation
to pay, and comes within the principle
of Withers v. Reynolds, viz., that of
breach by anticipation. Besides, a late
case in the same state, decided lst year,
denies in express terms the right to
rescind in such cases: Hime v. Klasey,
9 Brad. App. 166 ; s. c. Id. 190.
Smith v. Lewis was clearly an entire
contract, so held by the court, and for
that reason decided as it was. The
opinion of the court plainly implies that
had the contract been several the
result would have been different. The
object of the contract was single, and the
fact that there were separate items was
wholly unimportant.
Catlin v. Tobias is an admirable instance of the rule that the intention of
the parties is to govern. The contract
was for the delivery of a certain quantity
of bottles from time to time, the vendees
being manufacturers of medicine. Either
party, on failure to perform, was to pay
a forfeit. Nothing was said as to the

time of payment, but from the evidence
it appeared that it was to be after all the
deliveries were made (p. 222). It was
held, that the evident intention of the
parties was that the contract should be
performed in terms, as it was doubtless
made by defendant with a view to his
requirements in business, i. e., bottling
his medicine. The suit was for a
single delivery, and that imperfect,
and the court said, that conceding
it to be. a series of separate contracts,
the delivery being incomplete could
not be recoverd on. The referee
and court below had held that there
were, practically, several contracts, and
as a general proposition they were supported fully in this by Seymour v. Davis,
2 Sand. S. 0. 239; Deming v. Kemp,
4 Id. 147. The last page of the court's
opinion (p. 223) is very instructive, and
shows the way in which this particular
contract was regarded, namely, that it
was one in which the parties evidently
contemplated full performance.
Lastly, the case of King Philip's Mills
v. Sater, is directly in point, and is
entirely in accord with the principal case.
But it is supported only by Hoare v.
Rennie, supra, itself unsupported, and
the court says in the course of its opinion : "But it is difficult to reconcile
the cases, especially the older ones, to
our notions of justice." The learned
court might well have substituted "impossible" for "difficult."
Other cases
might be cited in conformity with the
authorities given above; but it will
suffice to refer, in concluding the question
of authority, to the instructive opinion
of the court in The illarpland Fertilizing
Co. v. Lorentz, 44 Md. 218, and to the
brief of argument for the appellees in
the same case.
And now as to the wisdom of the rule
that the decided weight of authority seems
to establish, namely, that rescission Will
not be allowed of the whole contract except where the breach goes to the entire
consideration. It is a familiar principle
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of law, that forfeitures are never favored.
And there can certainly be no clearer instance of forfeiture, than the loss of'an entire bargain because of a breach which has
no real effect but upon a small part of it.
It is really quite impossible to draw any
valid distinction between an agreement
like that in the principal case, where
there were to be successive deliveries,
separately and independently paid for,
and a series of distinct agreements on
different pieces of paper.
As noticed
before, each little agreemeut is complete
in itself, and may be rescinded for a
breach which destroys it ; hut to enforce
a forfeiture of all the similar agreements for a breach of one is to extend to
forfeiture the greatest possible favor. It
is perfectly competent for parties to
embrace in. their contract an express
provision for rescission, and this is very
frequently done. But it is certainly not
consonant with the established policy of
the law to imply a condition precedent,
the breach of which sball work a forfeiture
far beyond the damage caused. What-

ever damage such breach does cause, the
injured party must of course be compensated for; and that is all he can
reasonably ask. Few contractors wilfully neglect to carry out their contracts.
It would be the worst possible, policy.
But in large undertakings of this kind
unavoidable accidents are apt to occur,
and it would, as it seems to me, be
monstrous to make a slight deviation
from exact performance an opportunity
for the other party to annul the bargain
at his pleasure. To imply such intention
is to credit the vendors with most unbusinesslike rashness.
It is impossible to deny the logic of
the opinion in the principal case." It is
certainly more accurate to call these
agreements "transactions" than " contracts;" but as has been well said,
there is no magic in words. And it is
conceived that principle and the authorities will hardly warrant the Supreme
Court in sustaining the decision.
Lucius S. LANDRETH.

Philadelphia.

Superior Court of Cook County, Ilinois.
SMITH v. BARCLAY.
Certificates of membership in the Board of Trade of Chicago are property, and
as such are liable for the debts of the owner on a creditor's bill to subject them to
the payment of his debts ; and the debtor will be restrained from disposing of his
certificate of membership, and ordered to execute a blank assignment thereof to the
receiver appointed in the cause.

CREDITORS bill against the debtor and the Board of Trade of
Chicago for discovery as to the debtor's ownership of a certificate
of membership in the Board, and as to the nature and value of
such certificate, and for an injunction to restrain the transfer
thereof.
The answers of the defendants set forth that the debtor was a
member of the Board of Trade in good standing, and was the
owner of a certificate of membership, which was transferable only
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in accordance with the rules of the board; that the market value
of such certificate, if transferable under the rules, was about
$1200, that there were about eighteen hundred members of the
board and a large surplus in its treasury. The answers denied
that the certificate was subject to compulsory transfer by order of
the court, or liable in any way to the payment of complainant's
debt.
On the hearing, it appeared that the fee for membership was
$5000; that the value of certificates was $4000; that they were
bought and sold on the market, held on speculation, and hypothecated for loans; that proper persons applying for admission to
membership were always admitted; that certificates were held by
dealers and commission men in the names of their brokers and
employees; that-when lost they were renewed, and that they were
frequently transferred; the rules in that regard being complied
with. The Act of Incorporation, section 6, provided: "Said corporation shall have the right to admit or expel such persons as
they may see fit, in manner to be prescribed by the rules, regulations and by-laws thereof." The rules contained various provisions
for the discipline, suspension, restoration, &c., of members, and
also contained the following:"Rule XI.-Section 1. Any person of good character and credit,
and of legal age, on presenting a written application, endorsed by
two members, and stating the name and business avocation of the
applicant, after ten days' notice of such applicafion shall have
been posted on the bulletin of the rkxchange, may be admitted to
membership in the association upon approval by at least ten (10)
affirmative ballot votes of the board of- directors, and upon payment of an initiation fee of.$5000; or on presentation of a certificate of unimpaired or unforfeited membership, duly transferred,
and by signing an agreement to abide by the rules, regulations
and by-laws of the association, and all amendments that may, in
due form, be made thereto.
"Sect. 2. Every member shall be entitled to receive a certificate
of membership, * * * and if the member in whose name said
certificate stands, has paid all assessments due, and has against
him no outstanding, unadjusted or unsettled claims or contracts
held by members of the association, and said membership is not in
any way impaired or forfeited, it shall, upon the payment of ten
dollars, be transferable upon the books of the association to
VOL. XXX.-52
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any person eligible to membership who may be approved by the
board of directors, after due notice, as provided in section 1 of
this rule. The membership of a deceased member shall be transferable in like'manner. by his legal representative. Prior to the
transfer of every membership, notice of application for such transfer shall be posted upon the bulletin of the Exchange for at least
ten days, when, if no objection is. made, it shall be assumed the
member has no outstanding claims against him."
The form of certificate issued by the board is as follows:c
.is a member of the Board of Trade of the city
of Chicago, in full and regular standing at the date thereof. The
membership hereby represented is subjected to annual assessments,
which being paid when due, it istransferable on the books of the
corporation to any person approved by the board of directors upon
surrender of this certificate and any current ticket of admission to
the Exchange rooms of the board issued on account of it. Such.
transfers may be made in writing by the party herein named, or
his legal representathre in form as provided on the reverse hereof."
Printed on the back appears:'"For value received, I hereby transfer and assign unto
,the membership in the Board of Trade of the city of
Chicago, represented by the within certificate, subject to the
rules and regulations of said Board of Trade, and provided said
membership is found not to be forfeited or impaired."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GARDNER, J.-As is seen, the question presented is, whether
the membership of Barclay in the Board of Trade, represented by
his certificate, is property which can be reached by a creditor and
appropriated in any way to the payment of his debt.
So far, the state courts in. Illinois have not passed upon the
question, and when reference is made to the precedents in other
courts, the decisions are not found to be uniform, nor are they
numerous. Taking them chronologically, we find, in 1874, in
flyde v. Woods, 2 Sawyer 655, a case in which both parties
seemed to assume that a membership in the San Francisco Stock
Exchange was property, and the struggle was over the proceeds;
the controversy being as to whether they should go to the creditors
of the member who were members of the Exchange, as provided
by its rules, or to his general, creditors. The court assumed the
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view that it was property, but limited and qualified by the conditions and provisions of the rules of the Exchange,. which gave it
to the creditors who were members of that body, and, disposed of
the proceeds accordingly. The case went to the Supreme Court
of the United States, and is reported. (Hyde v. Woods, 4 Otto
523.) In that court the nature of the membership appears to have
been discussed, and the court .say': "There can be no doubt that
the incorporeal right which Fenn had to his seat when he became
bankrupt was property, and the sum realized by the assignee from
its sale proves that it was valuable property. Nor do we think
there can be any reason to doubt that if he had made no such
assignment it would have passed, subject to the rules of the stock
board, to his assignee in bankruptcy, and that if there been left
in the hands of the defendants any balance after paying the debts
due to the members of the board, the balance might have been
recovered by the assignee." Farther on in the opinion the court
again refers to the membership as property, subject only to the
conditions imposed by the rules of the exchange.
In 1876, the question arose in the Unite. States District Court,
for the Northern District of Illinois, in a bankruptcy case, reported
as In re Sutierand,6 Bissell 526, and Judge BLODGETT held that
a membership in the Chicago Board of Trade was not property,
and did not go to the assignee in bankruptcy; that the certificate
of membership conferred "no property right," but only "a mere
personal privilege," and likened it to a membership in a Masonic
body, or a religious or social organization.
In 1877, the same question arose in the Superior Court of the
city of New York, in Bitterand v. Baggett, 4 Abb. N. C. 67,
where, in a proceeding supplementary to execution, in substance
like the case at bar, and where the claim was that a membership
in the New York Cotton Exchange was not property which should
go to the receiver, the court held otherwise, and referred to Hyde
v. Woods, 4 Otto 523.
In 1880, in a case not yet reported, but referred to in 10 Central
Law Jour. 500, and Albany Law Jour. 501, as Grocers' Bank v.
Murphy, the Common Pleas Court of New York city decided
exactly the opposite to the decision above cited in the Superior
Court of that city.
1 This case was reversed on appeal.
Y. Daily fReg., March 12th 1851.

See Dos Passes on Stock Brokers 91 ; N.
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In 1880, in two cases in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
viz.: Thompson v. Adams, 93 Penn. St. 55, and Pancoast v.
Gowen, Id. 66, that court held a seat in the Philadelphia Board
of Brokers as "not property in the eye of the law," but a mere
"license to buy and "sell at the meetings-of the board," and not
subject to execution, attachment or garnishment at the suit of a
creditor. Hyde v. Woods, is referred to, but not regarded as
authority on the principal question.
In 1880, in the United States District Court, for the Southern
District of New York, reported as In re Ifetchum, I Fed. Rep.
840, a case in bankruptcy, in which there was an application for
an order requiring the bankrupt, Ketcham, to make a transfer of
his seat in the New York Stock Exchange to the aqsignee in 'bankruptcy, or to such person as the assignee may procure as a purchaser, the court sustained the motion and made the order.
The court, CHOATE, J., says: "I think the case cannot be
distinguished in principle from the case of Gallagher v. Lane,
19 N. B. R. 224, in which it was determined that a Washington
market lease was property that belonged to the assignee. As in
that case the consent of the city was necessary to transfer, so here
the consent of a committee of the Stock Exchange is necessary
to a transfer of this right. The seat, however, has an actual
pecuniary value, which the rules of the society, as interpreted and
applied in practice, permit the holder to realize by a sale and
transfer. There is no practical difficulty in effecting a transfer of
this right or interest for a pecuniary consideration, subject to the
condition that the debts of the present holder to members are first
paid; and the right or privilege is to all intents and purposes a
business right or privilege, useful for business purposes only. I
see nbthing in the rules of the Exchange which renders it impossible
for the seat to be disposed of by the assignee in bankruptcy, with
the co-operation of the bankrupt, subject to the condition above
mentioned. The equity of the creditors in the matter is as obvious
as in the case of the market lease. This seat in the board was
actually used as a part of the business capital of these bankrupts
as stockbrokers. To suffer the bankrupts still to hold it virtually
withdraws several thousand dollars in value of their business assets
from the creditors."
.Hj~e v. Woods, 4 Otto 523, is in no way distinct from the one
under consideration. "The controlling consideration is, as it
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seems to me, that practically, and whatever its form or incidents
with respect to other matters may be, it is a part of the bankrupt's
business assets, or more generally, of his property, which it was
the primary design of the bankrupt law to distribute among his
creditors, and that the. peculiarities which distinguish this from
other property are, in view of the evident purpose and scope of the
bankrupt law, unessential; mere technicalities-cobwebs-which
the law is strong enough to break though." [Per CHOATE, J., I"n
the matter of Ketchum, supra.]
So far as is disclosed in the reports, in all these cases the provisions of the various boards regarding memberships and their
transfer were, in all essential matters, similar to those of the
Chicago Board of Trade, some of them rather narrower, in that
transfers could only be made to members elect, while, as we have
seen, the. provision of the Chicago Board makes them transferable
"to any person eligible to membership, who may be approved by
the Board of Directors," a distinction, perhaps, with little practical
difference.
As is seen, the authorities are conflicting, but it seems to me
that the weight of sense and reason is with those which hold these
memberships are property.
An actual investment of a large sum of money is necessary for
their procurement; they are available as assets, either by sale or
hypothecation, they are transferable by the holder, or his legal
representative in case of his decease; the conditions attending their
transfe: are, practically easy of fulfilment, and their conversion
into money, or money's worth, at the will of the holder, is a matter
of no practical difficulty. To hold them not property is to place
beyond the reach of the law a large amount of actually available
and convertible assets which, in almost any other conceivable torm,
could be readily reached by the proper legal methods, and appropriated to the payment of the debts of the holder.
Let a decree be entered enjoining the defendant, Barclay, from
otherwise disposing of his certificate of membership, and that he
execute a blank assignment of such certificate, and deliver the
same with such certificate, and the ticket of admission issued
thereon to the receiver in this cause.
stock exchanges,
Unincorporated
boards of brokers or boards of trade,
in the manner in which they are usually

constituted, are neither joint stock companics nor partnerships, as between the
members thereof, whatever may be their
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relations to third parties : White v.
Brownell, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 162, 191;
S. 0. 3 Id. 318; Leech v. Harris, 2
Brewst. 571, 575; Caldicott v. Griffiths, 8 Exch. 898; 1 ILind. on Part.
*56, 57.
There may be property belonging to
such a body, derived from the payment
of dues or fines, or consisting of the
furniture of the room where the board
meets ; but the possession of it is a mere
incident, and not the main purpose or
object of the association. A member
has no severable proprietary interest in
it, or a right to any proportionable part
of it upon withdrawing. He has merely
the enjoyment and use of it while a
member, but the property remains with
and belongs to the body while it continues to exist; and when the body
ceases to exist, those who may then be
members become entitled to their proportionate share of its assets : White v.
Brownell, supra. Per DALY, F. J.,
citing, St. James Club,. 13 Eng. L. &
Eq. 592; .Fassett v. -D'rst Parish in
Boylston, 19 Pick. 361.
As to the nature of the right of membership, a seat in one ef these bodies
is said to be a species of incorporeal
property-a personal, individual right
to exercise a certain calling in a certain
place, but without the attributes of descendibility or assignability which are
characteristic of other species of property: Dos Passos on Stock Brokers,
87. The ownership of a seat is not
absolute and unqualified, but is limited
and restricted by the rules of the body
issuing the same. The owner can not
sell the seat to a person whom the body
will not recognise: Hyde v. lWoods,
94 U. S_ 523; Dos Passos on Stock
Brokers 87, citing White v. Brownell,
3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 318; Leech v.
Harris, 2 Brewst. 571. Neither can it
be directly seized on attachment or execution at the suit of a creditor of the
owner: Allen, Jr. v. N. Y. Cotton Bxchange, N. Y. Daily Reg., March 31

1881 ; Pancoast v. Gowen, 93 Penn. St.
66 ; Thompson v. Adams, 93 Penn. St.
55. In Pancoast v. Gowen, supra, the
court in delivering their opinion, say:
" A seat in the board of brokers is
not property subject to execution in
any form.' It is a mere personal privilege, perhaps more accurately, a license
to buy and sell at the meetings of the
board. It certainly could hot be levied
on and sold under a ft. fa. The
sheriff's vendee would acquire no
title which he could enforce, nor is it
within either the words or the spirit
of the Act of June 16th 1836, sect.
35 (Pamph. L. 767), providing for attachment on judgment. Whether the
proceeds of the sale of the seat in the
hands of the treasurer of the board, and
payable to the defendant, according to
the regulations and by-laws of the board,
could be thus reached, is an entirely different question. This, and no more, is
what we understand to have been
decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Hyde v. Woods, 4 Otto
525, where Mr. Justice MiLLEU says,
'If there had been left in the hands of
the defendants any balance after paying
the debts due to the members of the
board, that balance might have been
recovered by the assignee' in bankruptcy."
In this case upon a judgment
obtained by Pancoast against Houston,
an attachment execution was issued, and
served upon Gowen and others, trading
as The Philadelphia Stock Exchange, as
garnishees.
The answers of the garnishees admitted that Houston, the defendant in the judgment, owned a seat
in fie stock exchange, against which
there were no claims by the members of
that body at the time the attachment
was issued, but they alleged that claims
had since been presented, and that
Houston held his seat subject, among
others, to the conditions below stated;
so that the real question involved in the
case appears to be whether the seat was
subject to direct sale on an attachment-
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execution or writ of garnishment ; and,
there having been no'attempt to invoke
the equity powers of the court, it does
not appear to have been necessary to
decide that a membership was in no
sense property, and hence there is no
real conflict betwecu this case and those
cases where the equity powers of the
court were invoked. In Evans v. Wister, Sup. Ct. Penn., 1 Weekly Notes
Cases 181, it was also held, that an attachment would not lie against the board
of brokers for the proceeds of the sale
of the seat of a member who was indebted to other members to an amount
exceeding the proceeds of his seat.
- In Thompson v. Adams, supra, the
court says that the seat is not property
in the eye of the law, and cannot be
seized in execution for the debts of the
members; but the point actually decided
was, that under the constitution and bylaws of the board, an equitable owner
of a seat, who has furnished the money
with which the legal owner obtained the
seat, but who is unknown to the association, can not share in the proceeds of
the sale of the seat upon the death of
the legal owner, as against members
of the board who are creditors of the
legal owner. By the constitution of the
Philadelphia Stock Bxchange, a seat in
which was in controversy in the cases
above cited, members held their seats
subject to the following conditions:
Any member had the right to sell his
membership to such person as should be
approved by the board, provided there
were no unsettled contracts or claims
against him by any member of the exchange for stock transactions ; and on
the death of a member his seat might be
sold by the secretary, and after satisfying tie claims of members, the balance
was to be paid to his personal representatives. The proceeds of a seat, if
sold, were to belong to the owner's
creditors, being members of the exchange, in proportion to the amounts of
their respective claims. Similar pro-

visions appear to have been adopted in
the various stock boards throughout the
country, so far as we can judge by the
reported cases.
Although, however, the seat of a
member cannot be levied upon and sold
by direct legal process, the better
opinion seems to be, as held in the
principal case, that a membership in
such a body, especially where, as in
the principal case, it is so treated by
the rules and practice of the board, is a
species of property, and that the courts
will, by the exercise of their equity
powers, or by process in aid of execution, compel an insolvent member to do
whatever may be needful to transfer his
seat under the rules of the board, and
apply the proceeds in satisfaction of his
debts: Dos Passos on Stock Brokers
92 ; Grocers' Bank v. Murphy, N. Y.
Daily Reg., March 12, 1881 ; Bitterband v. Baggett, 4 Abb. N. C. 67;
Campbell v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange, N.
Y. Daily Reg., January 11, 1881 ; In
re Keclam, 9 Rep. 305 ; s. c. 1 Fed.
Rep. 840. See, also, Hyde v. Moods,
94 U. S. 523. The weight of authority,
also, seems to be that the incorporeal
right of membership in such a board
passes to the assignee in bankruptcy of
the owner, subject to the rules of the
stock board: Hyde v. Woods, supra;
In re Ketdiam, supra. See, however,
contra, In re Sutherland, 6 Biss. 526.
The law upon this subject has been
excellently summarized by MrY.Dos
Passos, in his recent work on Stock
Brokers and Stock Exchanges, page 96,
as follows
"All the cases can be reconciled
by keeping in view the circumstances
under which they arose; and the following propositions may be deemed as
settled :
1. "That, in the disposition of a
seat, or the proceeds thereof, the members of the exchange will be preferred
to outside creditors.
2. "1That the seat is not the subject

